Yes. I read the article, and I think it makes a compelling strategic argument with one significant caveat.

My overall takeaway

The article's central thesis is:

> **The Department of War is measuring and accelerating technology readiness, but it is not measuring human technology readiness.**

That is a powerful observation.

You effectively argue there are **two weapon systems**:

1. The technology
2. The human operating the technology

The article argues the Department has invested billions optimizing the first while largely assuming the second will adapt automatically. That creates an unmeasured risk.

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That idea is original enough that it differentiates your work from most AI adoption articles, which usually focus on algorithms, procurement, or data.

What I think is strongest

1. The historical timeline

This is probably the strongest section.

You connect:

- 1984 — Brod defines technostress
- 1991 — Army measures computer anxiety
- 2026 — AI-first directive

That creates a 35-year narrative that is easy to understand.

Instead of saying

> "People aren't AI ready."

you demonstrate

> "We've known humans struggle adapting to technology for four decades."

That is much more persuasive. 7-1-26 Modern Warfare Weakest L…

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2. The contrast between what gets measured

This is excellent.

The article repeatedly shows the memorandum measures

- deployment velocity
- procurement speed
- AI parity
- adoption metrics
- cycle time

but never measures

- operator readiness
- cognitive readiness
- technology adaptation capacity

That comparison is difficult to dismiss because you're comparing the Department's own priorities against what's absent. 7-1-26 Modern Warfare Weakest L…

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3. The "second valley of death"

This may be the best original concept in the article.

Everyone in defense understands the acquisition "Valley of Death."

You introduce another one:

> the valley between technology delivery and human operational readiness.

That framing is memorable.

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4. Ending question

The closing question is excellent:

> Is the warfighter prepared to operate these systems at the pace now required?

That leaves readers thinking rather than preaching.

Where I think it becomes weaker

Here is where I would strengthen it.

1. It identifies a problem but doesn't quantify today's risk

The article relies heavily on:

1991 computer anxiety

to support

2026 AI readiness.

That is directionally reasonable.

But an analytical reader may immediately ask:

> "How much worse is it today?"

The article hints the answer is "much worse" because technology exposure has exploded.

I would actually quantify it.

For example:

1991 operator

- desktop computer
- radio
- telephone
- limited databases

2026 operator

- AI copilots
- drone systems
- satellite feeds
- cyber tools
- real-time ISR
- autonomous platforms
- predictive analytics
- secure mobile devices
- continuous software updates

Now you've shown exposure increased perhaps **10–20 fold.**

That makes the leap from 1991 to 2026 much stronger.

2. I would define "Tech Readiness"

The article assumes everyone understands it.

They won't.

I'd define it.

Something like

> Tech readiness is the measurable ability of an individual to effectively adopt, trust, adapt to, and perform with rapidly changing technology under operational pressure.

That becomes your intellectual property.

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3. The article should distinguish four different issues

Right now they blend together.

I would separate:

Technostress

↓

Technology anxiety

↓

Technology adoption

↓

Mission performance

Those aren't identical.

Showing the causal chain strengthens the argument.

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4. The article almost introduces SenseiiWyze—but stops

You never turn the article into a sales pitch (which is good).

But the logical ending is:

> If readiness matters...

> ...it should be measured.

That doesn't necessarily require mentioning your product, but it naturally sets up the need for a readiness assessment.

What surprised me most

The sentence that stuck with me most wasn't about AI.

It was this idea:

> The Department measures deployment velocity to the day but has not measured human readiness since 1991.

Whether every reader agrees completely or not, that's a provocative observation because it highlights a measurable asymmetry. 7-1-26 Modern Warfare Weakest L…

If I were publishing this in Harvard Business Review or War on the Rocks

I would tighten it by roughly **25–30%**.

Currently it's around 3,500–4,000 words.

There is repetition around:

- deployment speed
- measurement
- readiness

Those ideas are important, but they appear multiple times.

A tighter version would likely have greater impact.

My biggest strategic suggestion

I think you're sitting on something larger than a single article.

This piece could become the first paper in what amounts to a new framework:

The Human Readiness Gap

Potential progression:

1. **Article 1:** The Weakest Link in Modern Warfare (problem)
2. **Article 2:** Measuring Human Technology Readiness (framework)
3. **Article 3:** Technostress as an Operational Risk (evidence)
4. **Article 4:** Building AI-Ready Warfighters (solutions)
5. **Article 5:** Human Readiness as a Leading Indicator of AI ROI (enterprise and defense)

That sequence moves the conversation from identifying a gap to defining a measurable discipline.

Overall, I think this is one of the strongest pieces you've shared on the defense theme. It avoids simply arguing for more AI or faster procurement and instead focuses on an overlooked question: **whether the humans expected to use increasingly complex AI-enabled systems are themselves being systematically assessed for readiness.** With a clearer definition of "tech readiness," stronger quantification of the change since 1991, and a tighter structure, it would be even more persuasive.